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COMPARE is the software model used to estimate Most Efficient Organization 
(MEO) labor costs during A-76 competitions and does an adequate job of cost estimation 
for units that provide generally low level technology services, labor and supervision to 
organizations.   With Outsourcing and Privatization (O&P) being considered across a 
wider cross section of organizations, COMPARE may be unable to provide a comparable 
picture of MEO costs suitable for use in source selection. 
The purpose of this research will be to identify common characteristics of more 
complex studies, specifically, the Air Force depot workload competitions at San Antonio 
Air Logistics Center (SA-ALC) and Sacramento Air Logistics Center (SM-ALC), and to 
highlight cost comparison factors that may not be adequately addressed in the 
COMPARE model. Once identified, an analysis of the underlying reasons for the 
difference in cost factors between models will be conducted. Results from research will 
confirm the current model (COMPARE) or will provide the basis for support and 
development of a new cost model. 
Research design for this thesis will focus on case study methodology identified by 
Robert K.. Yin in his book CASE STUDY RESEARCH Design and Methods (1994). 
Details are outlined in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
COMPARE AND COMPLEXITY - WHEN IS COMPARE NOT ENOUGH? 
I.      Introduction 
Overview 
Problem Statement 
With an increased emphasis on achieving greater efficiencies in government 
operations through the introduction of competition, Outsourcing and Privatization (O&P) 
is now considered across a significantly wider cross-section of organizations. Over the 
last decade, O&P initiatives (i.e. Public-Private Competition and A-76 Studies) have 
thinned the range of candidates to the point where further competitions are becoming 
increasingly difficult to model within the constraints of the current A-76 costing model 
(COMPARE). Specifically, the standardized cost factors used in COMPARE are 
increasingly insufficient in providing a level playing field on which decision makers can 
make informed comparisons. 
Identifying the gaps between cost factors in COMPARE and those commonly 
seen in Public-Private competition is the primary thrust of this research effort. Baseline 
cost factors will be identified as those used in the COMPARE model. With the exception 
of the Direct Conversion O&P option, the factors found in COMPARE represent the most 
basic form of comparison. On the other end of the spectrum are the cost factors used in 
Public-Private competition comparisons. In this study, cost factors from two Air Force 
depot Public-Private competitions will be used as a basis of comparison to the baseline 
factors found in COMPARE. Exploration of this range of factors should provide 
significant insight into the limitations of the baseline cost factors, thereby increasing 
awareness of considerations for future O&P initiatives. 
Overarching Issues 
Behind the impetus of O&P are many high level concepts regarding the 
appropriate relationships between business and government, their associated roles, and 
the means by which workload is delineated (i.e. organic/government or inorganic/private 
party). The following discussion provides a range of reactions to O&P trends. 
"It is in service delivery that competition yields results - because competition is 
the one force that gives public agencies no choice but to improve" (8:55). This statement 
describes what has, over time, become a topic of contention between those charged with 
creating policy and those who must conduct business within its boundaries. 
Budget cuts and business process reform have resulted in an increased interest in 
O&P over the last 50 years; especially with the resurgence of acquisition reform over the 
last decade. John P. White, Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum to the 
Secretaries of the Military Services, made the claim that O&P activities provide a means 
to achieve critical military objectives of maintaining a modern and ready force (10: 
Appendix 2). Success is measured in the ability to meet National Security Objectives 
with smaller budgets, a smaller force structure, continued readiness, and modernization 
(10:2). 
The Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General (IG), in a report titled 
Contractors on the Battlefield makes the following observation, "If contractors leave 
their jobs during a crisis or hostile situation, the readiness of vital defense systems and 
the ability of the Armed Forces to perform their assigned missions would be jeopardized" 
(9:1). Cynthia Robertson, in research for USAF Air Command and Staff College 
(ACSC) poses the hypothesis that the DoD, in reaction to renewed emphasis on 
"reinventing government", is making "the classic mistake of incongruity between 
military objectives and the national objectives" in implementing outsourcing initiatives 
(9:5). 
Research Scope 
Public-Private competition, A-76, and Direct Conversion are the three processes 
that will be examined in this research effort. Public-Private competition is a grass-roots 
acquisition strategy whose genesis is business process improvement. It may involve new 
missions or it may include any activity where the Air Force believes there are 
opportunities for improvements to efficiency and cost. A multitude of businesses and 
government agencies can compete for the work. In this thesis, Public-Private competition 
at two Air Force depots will be examined and contrasted with COMPARE model. The 
A-76 process narrows the field by focusing on competition between an in-house 
(government) bidder and commercial organizations. Finally, the Direct Conversion 
process is simply one that allows organizations to streamline conversion in cases where 
only a limited number of positions are affected. The underlying criterion requires only 
activities with fewer than 10 employees be considered for this strategy. 
With the exception of Direct Conversion, each of these strategies represents a 
considerable investment in time and money. Intangible costs, such as employee morale 
and disruption of work, are also prevalent. 
Research Questions 
The following questions distil the purpose of this research into its most basic 
elements. Individually, the answers to these questions will provide insight into the 
important cost factors for each type of O&P initiative. Taken as a whole, they provide 
insight into the potential shortcomings of COMPARE when competitions become 
increasingly complex. 
1. What are the baseline cost comparison factors established in COMPARE? 
2. What are the common cost factors found in the Air Force Depot Public-Private 
competitions? 
3. What are the similarities and differences between the cost factors established in 
COMPARE and those used in the Air Force Depot Public-Private competitions? 
4. What explains the differences between the cost factors established in COMPARE 
and those used in the Air Force Depot Public-Private competitions? 
5. What changes can be made to make COMPARE more robust in the comparison of 
more complex public and private entities? 
Document Structure 
The literature review, presented in Chapter II, provides an in-depth examination 
of relevant literature and defines a focus for the reader regarding the questions posed in 
Chapter I. Chapter III develops the methodology from which to measure the validity of 
conclusions drawn from accomplished research. Data Analysis, Chapter IV, provides a 
step-by-step breakdown of the cost factors under examination. Relationships between 
factors as well as significant differences will be identified and discussed. Chapter V 
presents a summary of research and results and offers conclusions and recommendations 
regarding the use of the COMPARE model. 
II.      Literature Review 
"Many argue that it is competition itself that reduces costs and improves 
service delivery, not whether a public or private sector entity ends up 
winning the competition" (19:Foreword). 
Introduction 
This section is an overview of literature that is pertinent to the research questions 
posed in Chapter I. This section begins by providing a contextual framework to aid the 
reader in understanding the background and operating environment of Outsourcing and 
Privatization (O&P). Regulatory guidance for Air Force O&P implementation is then 
provided to further refine the direction of research. The section continues by providing 
both background and details regarding Public-Private competitions, A-76 studies, and the 
Direct Conversion process. A summary is provided to recap the highlights of the section. 
Contextual Framework 
The study of any subject is incomplete without a solid understanding of its 
operating environment. For O&P, this environment is a labyrinth of policy and 
regulatory guidance designed to impress governmental intent upon those organizations 
charged with its execution. The following discussion provides a review of the O&P 
environment. 
Outsourcing versus Privatization 
Federal policy directs its departments to identify candidate organizations for O&P 
(13:1). While used interchangeably throughout both public and private documentation, 
O&P involves two very different constructs. Privatization involves "shifting the 
production of a good or the provision of a service from the government to the private 
sector, often by selling government assets" (11). Outsourcing, on the other hand, 
involves the "transfer of a support function traditionally performed by an in-house 
organization to an outside service provider, with the government continuing to provide 
appropriate oversight" (12). The key difference is the complete divestiture of work or 
assets by the government during privatization. 
Privatization or Public-Private Competition 
In order to understand the context of the privatization/Public-Private competition 
question, it is important to be able to differentiate between them. Privatization assumes 
that the public sector will always be more efficient, more effective, or will provide higher 
quality goods or services than a government organization. Public-Private Competition 
makes no such a priori assumptions (3:51). In reviewing the history of A-76 
implementation, this contextual distinction is helpful in determining the intentions of 
policy makers. 
The Outsourcing & Privatization Model 
The model in Figure 1 represents the relationship between different mechanisms 
for O&P For the purpose of this paper, the Air Force will be divided in to two parts: 
Core Activities and Commercial Activities. Commercial Activities (CA's) are candidates 
for O&P and can be divided into three sub-categories (13). These include Public-Private 
Competition, A-76, and Direct Conversion. Direct Conversion plays a minor role since it 
is generally limited to actions where there are fewer than 10 employees being considered 
for outsourcing (1). Public-Private Competitions and A-76 comparisons, however, play a 
major role in the government's O&P agenda. 
Many functions, such as combat operations or intelligence, are inherently 
governmental in nature. These activities, where it is in the best interest of the nation, are 
not candidates for performance by non-governmental employees and are considered to be 
Core Activities by the Air Force. Other activities, such as grounds maintenance or 
custodial work, are not inherently governmental and are considered candidates for 
outsourcing. This study will focus on CA's not considered inherently a governmental 
function. 
Identification as a CA does not necessarily mean that an organization's mission or 
function will automatically be privatized or outsourced. Identification is simply the first 
step in determining the most cost effective and efficient manner in which to conduct 
business. The cost comparison may indicate that retaining the mission in-house, by 
uniformed military or government civilians, provides the most effective use of resources. 
Within this framework, there are two primary strategies for determining the most 
beneficial outcome. These include Public-Private competition and the A-76 process. 
A-76 refers to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circular A-76 (1). The 




Figure 1- Outsourcing and Privatization Model 
Exemptions to A-76 
The following activities have been identified as exempt from consideration for 
conversion (2:7): 
1. Activities involving national defense or intelligence security. 
2. Activities that perform patient care when needed to maintain a certain quality 
of direct patient care. 
3. Core capabilities necessary to fulfill mission responsibilities or meet 
emergency requirements. 
4. Recurring and severable activities that perform research and development. 
5. No satisfactory commercial source is available. 
6. Functions with 10 or fewer full-time equivalent (FTE) employees. 
7. Activities where generally recognized industry performance and cost 
standards are not sufficient to meet governmental minimums. 
8. Activities where it is more cost effective (as determined through a formal cost 
comparison) to perform in-house. 
9. Temporary authorizations for in-house performance in the event of contractor 
default or termination. 
Outsourcing and Privatization - Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 38-6 
Air Force Policy Directive 38-6 is the guiding policy for institutionalizing optimal 
use of private and public resources (13:1). In order to concentrate its resources in areas 
most directly linked to achieving its core competencies the Air Force has developed four 
goals for O&P and has integrated them into the Air Force Outsourcing and Privatization 
Strategic Plan. These goals are to sustain readiness, improve performance and quality, 
generate funds for force modernization, and focus resources on core missions (13:12). 
The "vision" and "mission" in AFPD 38-6 include: 
Vision - an Air and Space Force whose premier war fighting capability 
and corporate culture are inextricably linked to the optimum use of 
national resources (13:12). 
Mission - to institutionalize the Air Force's optimum use of public and 
private resources by selecting the best source, either internal or external, to 
meet Air Force Requirements (13:12). 
AFPD 38-6 provides an excellent summation regarding the importance of O&P, 
"Because future capabilities of the Air Force depend so strongly on the success of O&P, 
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vigorous senior leadership involvement at all echelons of command and at all phases of 
this critical program is imperative" (13:14). 
The preceding discussion prepares the stage for examining O&P mechanisms, and 
associated cost factors, in detail. By understanding national and Air Force intent for 
O&P, an individual is better prepared to identify the specific issues involved in 
identification of appropriate cost factors. 
Public-Private Competition 
Of the three types of O&P mechanisms available, the Public-Private Competition 
(or Managed Competition) provides the broadest opportunity for organizations seeking 
the best value for the Government. The grass-root studies conducted for these 
competitions allow for the greatest expression of what constitutes a "best value." Eggers 
espouses this benefit of managed competition because it allows the "widest possible 
range of competition between different types of providers and is the best way of ensuring 
high-quality services at the lowest price with guaranteed performance" (20:1). 
According to Martin (19:7), over 30% of municipal and county governments 
nationwide are utilizing Public-Private competition. He further states that similar studies 
by the Council of State Governments highlight an increase in state departments and 
agencies. The trend, of capitalizing on competition, is also self evident at the national 
level, including within the Air Force where Public-Private competitions are increasingly 
implemented. 
A major benefit to Public-Private competitions is that they are not limited to the 
less flexible categories outlined in A-76 procedures, though there is growing evidence 
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that hybrid actions, such as the Business Analysis conducted for the 89th Airlift Wing 
(Andrews AFB), are gaining support. At Andrews, a waiver for A-76 procedures was 
approved to allow inclusion of several non-standard cost factors to be used in the 
COMPARE model. 
Definition 
Martin defines Public-Private competition in this way, "government procurement 
and quasi-procurement type situations in which the public sector competes with the 
private sector to provide government services" (19:7). He further states that "Public- 
Private competition is a maturation of privatization and contracting out (outsourcing) 
initiatives" as discussed earlier in this section. 
Forms of Public-Private Competition 
Martin further explains his understanding of Public-Private competition by 
breaking it down into three distinct forms. These include the Ad-Hoc Approach, 
Informal Bidding, and Formal Bidding (19:7). The Ad-Hoc Approach refers to a 
situation where public sector service delivery is simply compared to private sector service 
delivery. Informal Bidding is the process by which the public sector submits informal 
bids or proposals that are compared to formal bids and proposals submitted by the private 
sector. Finally, Martin discusses Formal Bidding, the process whereby the public sector 
submits formal bids and proposals that are compared with formal bids and proposals 
submitted by the private sector. 
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Ensuring a Level Playing Field in Public-Private Competition 
An underlying assumption of the O&P effort is the idea that competition will 
reduce costs and improve service delivery. An important economic assumption 
associated with competition is that there are many sellers (22:57). Many sellers, in 
theory, cause prices to be driven to a fair market value. This fair market price is the price 
that the government seeks to receive in any transaction, contract, or competition it is 
involved with. 
The concept of competition is critical to discussions regarding O&P mechanisms 
and their associated cost factors because if the factors are perceived as unfair, potential 
bidders will be reluctant to expend the necessary resources to participating in 
competitions. According to Dr. Lawrence Martin, "Depending on where one sits, there is 
wide disagreement about whether the 'playing field' is tilted to one sector or another" 
(19:4). William Eggers, Director of Privatization and Government Reform at the Reason 
Public Policy Institute, supports this view in stating, "increasingly, private providers are 
crying foul, arguing that the playing field is usually tilted against them in Public-Private 
competitions" (20: Executive Summary). He further emphasizes the necessity for 
competitive neutrality, "A competitively neutral competition policy requires that in-house 
units of government should not enjoy a net competitive advantage over their private- 
sector counterparts simply by virtue of public-sector ownership. At the same time, to the 
extent possible, institutional constraints that hamper the public-sector unit's ability to 
increase productivity, and therefore effectively compete with the private sector, should be 
eliminated" (20:Executive Summary). 
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Paul Meyer, Executive Director of the Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors 
of California (CELSOC) adds reality to the picture in his statement " Leveling the 
playing field may sound fine in theory, but in practice it just never happens. In actual 
fact, we have never witnessed a single example of a truly level playing field involving 
public and private-sector competition" (20:2). Michael Gagliardo, Executive Director of 
the Urban Water Institute of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, adds to this claim in saying 
"While you can't get to a 100% even playing field, you can get close" (20:2). 
Major Level Playing Field Issues 
In trying to level the field in terms of Public-Private competitions, Both Martin 
and Eggers have outlined factors that they consider important in conducting a fair 
evaluation. Alan Laverson adds his insights in the very focused area of overhead rates. 
These factors provide our first look at the types of cost factors we should seek when 
evaluating the cases in this study. 
Martin provides numerous ideas that pertain to achieving a level playing field. 
Of particular importance to this research are the following highlights. 
1. Mandated Private Sector Wage Scales - Inclusion of artificial wage scales causes 
the public sector to be more competitive because they do not have the same 
incentive to improve service quality or reduce cost as a private entity (19:12). 
2. Mandated Private Sector Employee Benefits - For similar reasons as the 
mandated wage scales, mandated benefits tilt the field in favor of the public sector 
(19:14). 
3. Minimum Cost Savings Thresholds - This advantage is significant to the public 
sector and is especially true when large dollar competitions are involved. On top 
of achieving efficiencies to meet the public entry, a private firm must add profit. 
An additional 5% or 10%, due to thresholds, can be a significant barrier to entry 
(19:14). 
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4. Cost Comparison Approach - Martin claims this to be the most critical of the 
leveling issues. The problem is that choice of methodology determines what 
public sector costs will/will not be included in the analysis. Two types are 
typical. These are the "fully allocated" approach and the "avoidable cost" 
approach. Martin recommends a hybrid approach whereby unavoidable costs of 
public sector delivery are added to the cost of private sector delivery. This 
"Texas" approach results in a competitively neutral position (19:14-15). 
5. Transition Costs - These are one time conversion costs and should be added to the 
cost of delivery for the current non-performing competitors (19:15). 
6. Contract Administration and Monitoring Costs - This type of cost includes all 
activities that are involved in the oversight, management, or administrative needs 
of service delivery (19:16). 
7. Penalties for Public Sector Failure to Perform - Like risk and the associated 
liability found in a private sector contract, there should be provisions to level the 
field for the public entry for failure to perform contractual work (19:17). 
Advantages and Disadvantages 
Eggers provides the following list of advantages and disadvantages that are 
inherent in government bids (20:2). The cost factors of interest are at the root of these 
items. 
•    Public Advantages 
1. Public entities enjoy a lower cost of capital. 
2. Public entities pay little or no taxes. 
3. They don't have to earn profit, rate-of-return on investments, or depreciation 
expenses. 
4. They have first hand knowledge of operations. 
5. Public entrants enjoy sovereign immunity/indemnification. 
6. Public organizations are typically self insured. 
7. They are usually exempted from some laws and regulations. 
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8.   Situations arise where there are close relationships with the staff evaluating bids. 
•    Public Disadvantages 
1. Regulatory guidance imposes unusually inflexible work rules. 
2. Public entities have to bid cost with little benefit from accurate accounting data. 
3. Public agencies are subject to rigid procurement and personnel rules. 
4. They experience higher employee benefit levels. This is differentiated from 
Martin's previous statement that mandated benefits tilt the field in favor of the 
public sector. Martin's point is that there is no flexibility in achieving efficiencies 
when benefits are dictated to a private offerer. 
5. They lack direct access to capital markets. 
6. Public entities face constitutional and statutory constraints. 
7. They have less economies of scale. 
8. They cannot move quickly on capital spending. 
Overhead Rates 
In his dissertation, A Study of Overhead Rate Behavior at a U.S. Air Force Base 
in the Context of A-76 Competitions (1999), Laverson provides very specific focus on 
overhead rates as they apply to outsourcing decisions. He states; "Overhead costs can be 
a significant factor when deciding if a commercial activity can be performed more 
economically by a contractor or the government" (21:13). 
Laverson's work is pertinent to this research because the 12% "default" overhead 
rate used in COMPARE has no analytical basis to support it (21:25). The COMPARE 
software (and associated guidance) makes provisions for use of a different rate, though 
this option is seldom exercised. This critical cost factor plays a large role in the bid 
amounts of private entities but is defaulted to 12% for public entrants. If this rate is 
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inaccurate, in-house estimates will be overstated when their actual rates are lower 
(21:25). The converse is equally true. Given the established DoD goal to conduct A-76 
competitions involving more that 170,000 positions from 1999-2005, the mistake of 
erroneous outsourcing decisions could result in the loss of tens of millions of dollars 
(21:25). 
Laverson provides a telling example in relating a story whereby the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) asked the Air Force to analyze 33 competitions (1990-96) that 
were won by public entities. The analysis determined that 12 of the 33 would have been 
won by the private sector had the 12% rule been in effect (21:26). This is significant 
considering the dubious basis for the 12% value. Incorrectly assessing overhead is a 
factor that cannot be overlooked when discussing a level playing field. 
OMB Circular A-76 
OMB Circular A-76 - Performance of Commercial Activities, and its antecedent 
Bureau of the Budget (BOB) documents, is the manifestation of Federal policy on the 
conduct of Commercial Activities (3:51). Federal policy on the conduct of Commercial 
Activities can be summarized into the following basic principles (1:1-2). 
Commercial Activities Principles of Conduct 
Achieve Economy and Enhance Productivity. A fundamental truth in business is 
that competition spawns improvement in efficiency and productivity. When the 
government performs a function in-house, it is operating in a competition-free 
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environment. By introducing competition, via the commercial sector or other 
government agencies, significant savings can be achieved. 
Retain Governmental Functions In-House. There are certain functions of 
government that must remain separate from the commercial domain. It is in the best 
interest of a nation to maintain armed forces, as an extension of its ability to enforce 
policy, free from business motives of commercial enterprise. 
Rely on the Commercial Sector. Whenever an activity or service is determined to 
be non-inherently governmental, it becomes a candidate for outsourcing to the 
commercial sector. The assumptions made on the achievement of economy and 
enhancement of productivity now come into play. 
Government Perspective 
In order to understand the current environment of A-76, it is important to 
understand the perspective with which the Government views its place in separating 
operational capability from support roles. The following paragraphs will facilitate this 
understanding. 
"In the process of governing, the Government should not compete with its 
citizens" (1:1). The Federal Government has long recognized the need to balance the 
interests of national security with the need to operate in an efficient, businesslike manner. 
To this end, and with varying degrees of success, it has made a distinction between the 
functions it performs, which are inherently governmental, and those that are not. This 
determination rests on a number of factors, including the level of Federal control 
required, the nature of the function performed, statutory provisions, and the distinction 
between oversight and recurring operations (2:3). 
An inherently Governmental function is one that is "so intimately related to the 
public interest as to mandate performance by Government employees" (1:2). Functions 
that are determined not to be inherently governmental are candidates for outsourcing, 
through private contract or Inter-Service Support Agreement (1SSA). 
A-76 Process 
Once an activity has been identified as non-inherently governmental, it becomes a 
candidate for outsourcing to a commercial enterprise or another governmental 
organization. A formal cost comparison is used to determine if it is more cost effective to 
retain an activity in-house or to contract with a private entity or other government agency 
through an Inter-service Support Agreement (1SSA). CIRCULAR NO. A-76 Revised 
Supplemental Handbook governs conduct of the cost comparison. The process can be 
divided into six major components (2:10). 
Components of the A-76 Process 
1. Development of a Performance Work Statement (P WS) and Quality 
Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP) 
2. Determine the Most Efficient Organization (MEO) 
3. Determine the ln-House Cost Estimate 
4. Develop a Request for Proposal (RFP) or Invitation for Bid (1FB) 
5. Conduct the Cost Comparison 
6. Administration of the Appeals Process 
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The PWS specifically defines the work performed and output produced by a 
Commercial Activity. It serves as the most basic means of comparison between 
competing activities. The QASP identifies the measures of merit by which the MEO or 
contract performance will be measured once awarded. The MEO is the organization that 
will become the government competitor in any cost comparison. It represents the 
governments best effort in meeting the requirements set forth in the PWS and capitalizes 
on all possible efficiencies in order to be competitive with the private sector. 
The 1HCE is summation of all MEO operating costs. It provides the basis for the 
government bid in the Cost Comparison step. The mandatory costing software for DoD 
Components is COMPARE (4:17). In the Request for Proposal (RFP) / Invitation for Bid 
(IFB) step, the initiation of the actual solicitation for bids to commercial entities occurs. 
Potential contractors use the PWS to develop their responses. These become the basis for 
their bid during cost comparison. 
Once both the in-house (MEO) bid and top contractor bit are available, they are 
evaluated to determine the winning bid. COMPARE prepares the Cost Comparison 
Form (CCF) used in making the cost comparison decision. It is important to point out 
competing entities must beat the MEO bid by a minimum cost differential based on 10% 
of the MEO direct labor cost or $10 Million (2:28). 
Parties who want to challenge the cost comparison have the opportunity to appeal 
the decision. Several criteria must be met before the Administrative Appeal Authority 
will review the decision (5:55,58). In identifying these exempt activities, the Federal 
government is able to adhere to the following stated policies: Achieve Economy and 
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Enhance Productivity, Retain Government Functions In-House, and Rely on the 
Commercial Sector (1:2). 
Direct Conversion 
Direct Conversion is simply a streamlined method to allow conversion of 
workload to in-house, contract, or Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA), without 
conduct of a cost comparison. Conditions for use of Direct Conversion require that only 
activities with fewer than 10 full-time equivalent (FTE) employees be eligible and that all 
offerors are able to provide required levels of service quality at fair and reasonable prices 
(2:4). 
Chapter Summary 
In the preceding sections we developed a knowledge base to draw upon during the 
conduct of further research. These sections are relevant because they build the 
framework with which to begin evaluation of cost factors that were developed in 
Ensuring a Level Playing Field and Considerations. We established a frame of reference 
in Contextual Framework and provided a summary of regulatory guidance in the AFPD 
38-6 section. Finally, applicable theory, definitions, and processes of each of the three 
O&P mechanisms were provided. With this background, we will proceed with discussion 
of the methodology used in the development of these studies. 
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III.     Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the methodology that will be used to measure the validity 
of conclusions drawn from accomplished research. Chapter III starts by distinguishing 
between qualitative and quantitative methods used to achieve validity. The Case 
approach is the qualitative method followed in this thesis. The appropriateness of this 
method is justified in following discussions. Chapter III then expands into explanation 
and validation of the design process to be used. In this effort, individual cases will be 
examined then cross-case conclusions will be drawn to meet demands of the research 
questions stated in Chapter I. 
A Case for Qualitative Methods 
What is a Qualitative Method? 
"The label qualitative methods has no precise meaning in any of the social 
sciences. It is at best an umbrella term covering an array of interpretive techniques which 
seek to describe, decode, translate, and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not 
the frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world" 
(15:9). 
In beginning a chapter with this statement, there is an implication that qualitative 
research methods must be defended in order to gain support of the research. In 
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Qualitative Methodology, editor John Van Maanen supports this claim. Maanen 
postulates, "since quantitative methods have held an almost monopolistic grip on the 
production of knowledge in the field, any serious reflection regarding current theory must 
at some point consider the value of alternative methods" (15:11). He further asserts, 
"there is a growing concern about where quantitative techniques are carrying us" (15:11). 
In this, he implies that quantitative research procedures have become so "ritualized" that 
there is a disconnect between what is being measured and the concept under study 
(15:11). 
Mintzberg, in an essay titled An Emerging Strategy of "Direct" Research, 
provides additional support for the claims of Van Maanen. He states, "Too many of the 
results have been significant only in the statistical sense of the word. In our work, we 
have always found that simpler, more direct methodologies have yielded more useful 
results" (15:107). 
Designing a Research Strategy 
Many different research strategy options exist for a research effort. Robert Yin 
lists five specific types for consideration (6:6 - Figure 1.1). These include: the 
experiment, a survey, an analysis of archival material, a study of historical material, and a 
case study. Each can be evaluated for their proper relevance based on the research 
objective. When choosing a strategy, the researcher must identify the form of question 
being pursued. "In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why' 
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when 
the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context (6:1)." 
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Methodology 
Having supported the validity of the case study, this methodology has been 
selected it as a reasonable approach to provide support for the research questions posed 
earlier in Chapter I. With this determination comes a series of further questions that must 
be answered in order to define the specifics of the design process. 
Design Construct 
There are many different designs that must be considered before deciding on a 
particular one. Each is suitable for different situations. There are single and multiple 
cases as well as Holistic and Embedded designs. Yin summarizes these relationships in 
the following table (6:39). 







(single unit of 
analysis) 





TYPE 2 TYPE 4 
The distinction between single-case and multiple-case design (columns) simply 
delineates how many cases are going to be used to address the research questions (6:39). 
The row headings "holistic" vs. "embedded" distinguish between single and multiple 
units of analysis within a case (6:41). 
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Multiple-Case - Embedded Design 
For this research, the Multiple-Case - Embedded design is the most suitable. It 
allows for the comparison of three separate cases to ascertain the thesis objectives. A 
single case would allow no basis for comparison and the global nature of a holistic design 
does not lend itself to the low-level examination of cost factors that must be 
accomplished. The primary advantage of multiple case analysis is that the analysis is 
considered more robust and the results more compelling than with a single case effort 
(6:45). 
In conducting a multiple case analysis, replication, rather than statistical 
sampling, is of importance. The distinction is in the logic behind replication of an event 
rather than the logic prescribed to statistical sampling. If, in the course of an experiment 
a prediction is made and then bears true in multiple cases, replication is evident (6:45). 
Sampling logic involves the theory whereby outcomes of the entire pool of cases can be 
predicted through the representation of a few cases. 
An item of concern in this study is the lack of suitable cases to examine in order 
to show literal replication. In a literal replication, identification of similar results in each 
case is the goal. In this study, the concept of theoretical replication will be used instead. 
The two depot cases represent 40% of the USAF depot base (2 of 5). Addition of the 
baseline case - the COMPARE model, provides an excellent yardstick since all A-76 
studies (baring rule changes) have been, or will be, completed using its construct. 
Examination of these three cases provides a sufficient base to identify contrasts between 
them. Furthermore, the reasons for the different cost factors in each should be explicable 
and therefore predictable. This is theoretical replication as defined by Yin (6:46). 
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Summary of Design Process 
In observance of the aforementioned criteria for developing a case study, the 
following model will serve as the basis for conducting the case study analyses necessary 
for this thesis. In brief, each case will be developed separately, and then the cross-case 








Note: Dotted lines indicate 





























Figure 2 - Basic Design Types 
Theory Development 
In this report, the research questions posed in Chapter 1 serve as the guiding 
influence. Here, the research objective is to provide defendable responses to each 
question rather than prove or disprove a hypothesis and associated theory. 
26 
Case Selection 
Three cases have been identified for this study. The COMPARE model (Case 1) 
serves as a baseline for cost factor comparison. It is highly standardized and represents a 
stable platform with which to evaluate the similarities and differences of cost factors 
found in the remaining two cases. All competitions using standard A-76 procedures can 
be represented by this model. 
Cases 2 and 3 were selected as representative of having relatively extreme 
examples of cost factors that might be encountered during Public-Private competition. It 
is important to mention that these cases had the significant benefit of complete and 
accessible data with which to evaluate. The C-5 Business Area Competition, held at the 
San Antonio Air Logistic Center (SA-ALC), Kelly AFB, Texas comprises Case II. Case 
III is from the Sacramento Air Logistics Center (SM-ALC), McClellan AFB, California, 
Workload Competition. 
Data Collection Protocol 
Case I will serve as the base line in development of data collection procedures. 
The COMPARE software and associated regulatory guidance will be examined to 
identify the core cost factors involved in completion evaluation. Each of the remaining 
cases will be examined to reveal their critical cost factors. Rationale behind the different 
factors and their relationships to the total evaluated cost of the bid will be evaluated. 
Case Conduct, Reporting, and Cross-Case Conclusions 
Each case will be analyzed separately to identify the cost factors that are 
associated with computation of the bids total evaluated cost. Individual reports will also 
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be prepared for each. The cost factors identified in Cases II and III will then be analyzed 
for commonalities and differences. Finally, each factor will be matched to its related 
factor in the Case I benchmark. Unmatched cost factors will be highlighted and will 
serve as the response to the third research question. A final cross-case report will serve 
as the basis for answering the final research question. 
Critical Aspects of Research 
In any research design effort, there are several standards that must be met to 
validate a study. Yin combines these into four critical aspects of any research design 
effort (6:32-33). These include: 
1. Construct Validity 
2. Internal Validity 
3. External Validity 
4. Reliability 
Each is a measure of the quality of the research being presented and serves to 
strengthen the position of the study logic. A summary of these tests and associated 
implementation tactics is provided by Yin (6:33 - Figure 2.3). 
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Table 2 - Case Study Tactics 
Tests Case study tactic 
Phase of research in 
which tactic occurs 
Construct validity 
Use multiple sources of 
evidence 
Establish chain of evidence 
Have key informants review 
















Use case study protocol 




The concept of construct validity refers to the establishment of operational 
measures for study topics (6:32).   Construct validity involves ensuring that there are 
multiple sources of proof for the data being used. In this study, the data used for Case I is 
supported by regulatory guidance that is widely available in the public domain. Data for 
Cases II and III carry slightly less weight than that of Case I due to the lack of formal 
procedures for record keeping but is augmented by the existence of the Cost 
Comparability Handbook (26) as a standard reference. The validity of the source 
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documents for these cases also comes from the numerous collaborating documents and 
briefings where the figures were presented. 
Internal Validity 
Internal validity refers to the establishment of causal relationships in a study. 
Pattern-matching, explanation-matching, and time-series analysis are the tools for 
ensuring internal validity. These are used in explanatory or causal studies and are not 
applicable to this effort (6:32). 
External Validity 
External validity is achieved through replication logic in multiple case studies. It 
refers to the parameters where research results can be generalized. Case 1 is an example 
where absolute replication is possible. Procedures are highly standardized and results are 
predictable. The limited number of cases to draw upon serves as a barrier for establishing 
external validity in the two depot cases. Even so, it is reasonable to conclude that 
similarities in cost factors between Cases II and III would allow a comfortable degree of 
predictability in the event any of the remaining air force depots were targeted for an O&P 
effort. Both depots were structured similarly and were subject to the same regulatory 
guidance in performance of activities. Environmental or geographical differences that 
separate the two depots are factors that can be predicted. It is important to remember that 
the thrust of this research is to identify the differences between the depot competitions 
and the baseline COMPARE model. 
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Reliability 
Reliability is the property that will allow others to repeat the work contained in a 
research effort. Reliability is achieved through consistent application of case study 
protocol. In this study, the protocol followed is the Multiple-Case - Embedded Design 
discussed earlier in the chapter. Each case will be conducted according to the model 
provided in Figure 2. 
Chapter Summary 
The appropriateness of the case methodology, and associated design process, used 
in this research effort should now be established. The design process and adherence to 
the standards established for validity (construct, internal, and external) and reliability 
should provide confidence in the conclusions that will be identified in subsequent 
sections. 
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IV.      Data Analysis 
Overview 
In accordance with the methodology described in Chapter III, the three target case 
studies are now presented. Case I will serve as the baseline for review of cases II and III. 
Each case analysis will consist of an overview, followed by cost factor identification and 
description. Upon completion of the individual cases, cross-case conclusions will be 
drawn. Before analyzing individual cases, a review of source selection activities will be 
presented to refine the context of the individual cost factors that are the focus of this 
effort. 
Source Selection Activities 
To conduct a comparison of A-76 and Public-Private competitions, it is helpful to 
first break down the source selection process into its most basic units. These are: Pre- 
Solicitation Activities, Evaluation Activities, and Award Activities. In order to show the 
proper context of cost factors within the source selection process, a side-by-side 
comparison model is also provided. 
Pre-Solicitation Activities 
Prior to an Outsourcing and Privatization initiative, there are several pre- 
solicitation activities that take place. For the A-76 competition, a commercial activities 
inventory starts the process. A commercial activities inventory is a formal list submitted 
to the Office of Management and Budget (by agency) detailing all commercial activities 
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performed by in-house employees. The inventory serves as the basis for identification of 
candidates for O&P initiatives. For Public-Private competitions, acquisition strategy 
planning is the genesis of an O&P initiative. Acquisition strategy planning begins with 
the identification of an unfulfilled requirement, mission need, or a planned/directed 
change in business practice. 
Next, each process conducts planning to outline the scope of the O&P activity 
under consideration. In the A-76 process, a performance work statement (discussed in 
Chapter II) is created, while in the Public-Private competition, source selection planning 
is accomplished. Source selection planning includes identification of relevant factors and 
associated levels of relative importance, schedule projections, and demonstrated 
traceability between program risk and performance thresholds. 
Finally, each process results in either a Request for Proposal (RFP) or an 
Invitation for Bid (IFB). The RFP and 1FB provide prospective suppliers the basis upon 
which to build a realistic and reasonable proposal. Basis for Award and Evaluation 
Criteria and other evaluation factors (past performance, mission capability, risk, and 
cost/price) are included. 
Evaluation Activities 
Each type of O&P initiative involves an evaluation process, which allows for 
comparison of cost factors. It is in this step that the primary thrust for this research effort 
resides. In the A-76 process, the final comparison is made between one public bidder and 
a single private bid. The private bid has been identified as the lowest cost, responsive bid 
from all private entrants (down selected). In the Public-Private process, the government 
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bid is evaluated against all responsive and reasonable public bids to determine the best 
value. 
Evaluation also involves activities that are designed to level the playing field 
among interested parties. Two of these elements include a Technical Evaluation and a 
Risk Analysis. A technical analysis evaluates the bidders ability to meet objective and 
performance requirements. Focus of this evaluation is on the strengths and inadequacies 
of an offerors proposal (23:2). Risk Assessments are conducted to identify risk 
associated with scheduling, proposal approach, and past performance (23:3-4). The A-76 
process relies upon previously discussed assumptions of competition (Chapter 2) to 
minimize risk while the Public-Private competition relies on several formal studies to 
determine appropriate levels and types of risk. 
Award Activities 
Award Activities in each process involve several key steps. There is a decision 
briefing, comprised of pertinent information and criteria, to aid the source selection 
authority in making an award decision. Considerable effort is also expended in 
documenting the evaluation and analysis of entrants. Finally, open and frank 
communication, in the form of debriefings, is encouraged with entrants. 
Outsourcing and Privatization Activities Comparison Model 
The following diagram depicts these O&P activities. The model is not presented 
as all-inclusive, but provides a general understanding of each process, inception to 
implementation, and allows comparison of the different levels or activities involved in 
34 
each. A general understanding of the Pre-selection and Award Activities helps put into 
context the thrust of this thesis. 
Step A-76 
1        Pre Solicitation Activities 
2 Evaluation Activities 
Level Playing Field 
Cost Factor 1 
Cost Factor n 
Technical Analysis 
Risk Analysis 





Figure 3 - Outsourcing and Privatization Activities Comparison Model 
Case I - Cost Factors for A-76 (COMPARE) 
Case Overview 
The purpose of this case is to establish an evaluation benchmark for Cases II and 
III as well as to answer the first research question posed in Chapter I: "What are the 
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baseline cost comparison factors established in COMPARE?" Information contained in 
this analysis is drawn from the COMPARE software as well as the A-76 Costing Manual 
(4). The cost factors identified should be considered applicable to any A-76 action since 
COMPARE is the only authorized cost model. 
Cost Factor Identification 
The factors involved in calculation of the in-house (public) bid form the basis for 
comparison with the private bids received. The public bid must include all applicable 
factors in its submission. In the model, specific line items from private bids are entered 
into COMPARE to allow comparison to the public bid and identification of the lowest 
bidder. The following 18 categories represent the top-level factors included in 
COMPARE. Each is broken down into its subcomponents where appropriate. It is 
important to note that COMPARE leaves latitude for custom factors in many of the 
categories. 
• Personnel Costs. Personnel Costs include the cost of all direct in-house labor and 
supervision. Work tied to quality control, administration, and inspection of any 
support contracts involved, is also included. Fringe benefits, overseas allowances and 
other entitlements also comprise this list. Care must be taken to ensure the proper 
inflation factors are used over the performance period (4:23-44). 
• Materials and Supply Costs. Raw materials, parts, subassemblies, components and 
offices supplies are included in this figure. Only those costs directly attributable to 
performance of the MEO may be included. If an item will be provided as 
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) it should not be included as a cost to the 
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MEO since it is then neutral as far as competition is concerned. In preparation of 
MEO material and supply costs, care should be taken to ensure that any previously 
shared expenses are properly prorated (4:45-49). 
• Depreciation. Depreciation represents the cost of ownership and the consumption of 
an asset's useful life. In the A-76 process, only those items with an acquisition cost 
of greater than $5,000 are depreciated. The costs of shared items are prorated to the 
MEO based on the estimated percentage of use. The depreciable base used for cost 
calculations is based on the asset's acquisition cost (including transportation and 
installation) plus the cost of capital improvements less its disposal/residual value. 
Useful life can be determined by the factors in Appendix 8 of the A-76 Costing 
Manual or by local engineering estimates (4:50). 
• Cost of Capital. Cost of capital is an assigned charge on the Government's 
investment in capital assets used in providing the product or service of the MEO. As 
with depreciation, this charge applies to assets valued at $5,000 or greater. 
Assignment of this charge is necessary only when the MEO acquired an asset within 
two years prior to the cost comparison date or is a planned acquisition during the 
performance period. The basis of computation is the same cost basis used for 
depreciation multiplied by rates found in Appendix 5 of the Cost Manual. If the asset 
is shared, the previous product is multiplied by the appropriate percent of usage 
(4:54). 
• Rent. Rent includes any costs incurred for the use of land, buildings, space, 
machinery or capability by the MEO. Vehicles and equipment rentals are most 
common for the MEO. If the government is providing facilities or land to all bidders 
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(i.e. GFE), associated rental costs are not included in the cost comparison. Prorating 
expenses among shared rental items is expected (4:60). 
• Maintenance and Repair. This cost is incurred to keep buildings and equipment in 
normal operating condition. The cost of capital improvements is not included (4:60). 
• Utilities. Any charges for telephone, electricity, water, waste management, etc. are 
included in this cost factor. Costs are allocated or metered as appropriate to capture 
applicable charges and adjustments should be made for anticipated changes to 
expenses. The government has typically found it more cost efficient to furnish 
utilities were possible (4:61). 
• Insurance. Insurance provides protection from risks and associated costs from any 
potential property loss or liability claims that might arise during the conduct of an 
activity. The government is self insured, while a private bidder must acquire 
insurance at additional expense. To level the field, the government calculates 
equivalent costs for its assets and personnel. If the government furnishes equipment, 
the associated insurance need not be calculated unless specifically assigned in the 
solicitation (4:62). 
• Travel. Travel expenses incurred as part of developing the P WS or generated in 
developing and operating the MEO must be included in the cost comparison 
evaluation. Costs for travel can be easily calculated from budgeted amounts of the 
commercial activity under review or by MEO estimate (4:63). 
• MEO Subcontracts. The cost, to the MEO, of any subcontracts must be included in 
the evaluation. Additionally, COMPARE computes an appropriate deduction for 
Federal income taxes. This offsets potential revenue to the government from income 
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taxes. Costs are not limited to those services acquired through subcontracts. Costs 
incurred for services purchased by a Government purchase card (e.g. International 
Merchant Purchase Authorization Card - IMPAC) must also be included (4:64). 
• Other Costs. COMPARE makes provisions for inclusion of any other cost factors 
that are pertinent to the cost comparison. "Other costs" should include the cost of 
items that are valued at less than $5,000 and are not immediately consumed by the 
MEO. Office furniture, projectors, and tools fall into this category (4:65). 
• Overhead Costs. The MEO is automatically charged an overhead rate of 12% of the 
personnel costs discussed earlier. This charge is used to allocate overhead costs that 
are not necessarily visible to the commercial activity. A lack of specific overhead 
costs is due to a lack of a viable cost accounting system such as Activity Based 
Costing (ABC). Waivers to this policy are permitted if an agency can produce 
credible evidence that a different rate is appropriate.   The charge of an appropriate 
overhead rate is of major importance to both public and private competitors. The 
public bidder does not want to be unnecessarily burdened with a rate that overstates 
true costs, nor does it want to be held hostage to government constraints against the 
liquidation of assets that it is subject to. The private bidder seeks to ensure that the 
public bidder does not realize an unfair advantage because its overhead costs are 
buried in part of a larger, unrelated, organization. Failure to include overhead costs 
would significantly lower the cost of the MEO (4:68). 
• Additional Costs. This category allows for cost factors that are not otherwise 
properly classified in previous sections. Items such as transition expenses, 
conversion costs, and office/plant rearrangements are included in this line item. Any 
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new requirements, resulting from creation of the MEO, should be included here 
(4:70). 
• Contract Administration Costs. The costs discussed to this point have been added to 
the cost of the MEO. Contract administration costs are added to the cost of the 
private bidder or ISS A contestant. The purpose of this category is to account for the 
additional cost of contract inspection, quality assurance evaluations and other 
administrative expenses that are new to the government as a result of a private entity 
being awarded the bid (4:75). 
• One-Time Conversion Costs. Any conversion, whether public to private or private to 
public, involves one-time costs related to that conversion. COMPARE recognizes the 
following three categories: Labor, Material, and "Other" one-time conversion costs. 
Labor costs include severance pay, retraining costs and relocation expenses. Costs 
included in the material category are those such as the conduct of a joint inventory 
and the associated cost of transfer of ownership or responsibility. The last category is 
open to allow inclusion of costs such as accomplishing new background checks and 
security clearances (4:80). 
• Gain on Assets. In developing an MEO, an agency may identify capital assets that 
are now excess to requirements. The cost of disposal or transfer is assets is based on 
a decision of economic advantage to the taxpayer. If the cost of transfer of disposal 
exceeds the book value of the asset, the losses are not assessed against the 
private/ISSA offer. Only items that are deemed excess, but not made available to the 
private/ISSA bidder are assessed this charge (4:84). 
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• Federal Income Tax Deduction. Award of a contract provides a source of revenue 
that is subject to Federal income tax. This tax reduces the Governments net cost of 
contracting by generating revenue to the Government for the portion of the contract 
price subject to Federal income taxes. Unless an offerer is a tax-exempt entity, this 
deduction is made (4:87). 
• Minimum Conversion Differential. The minimum conversion differential represents 
a compilation of intangible costs that is applied to the incumbent service provider. 
The differential is the lesser of 10 percent of personnel costs or $10 million over all 
the contract performance periods in the solicitation. This minimum was established 
to protect the government from conversions where there are only marginal estimated 
savings. Examples of the factors considered in the differential are things such as 
morale, disruption, and other factors not specifically included in the in-house estimate 
(4:89). 
Case II - C-5 Business Area Competition, SA-ALC 
Case Overview 
This case represents the first of two Public-Private competitions that will be 
examined. This case centers on the C-5 Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) and 
Speedline programs, performed by the C-5 Business Area, at the San Antonio Air 
Logistics Center (SA-ALC) at Kelly AFB, Texas. The Speedline program refers to the 
Time Compliance Technical Order (TCTO) activities conducted to ensure readiness of 
the C-5 aircraft (24:3). The competition is a result of a June 1995 Base Realignment and 
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Closure Commission (BRAC) decision to determine where future workload would be 
performed (24:2). 
Cost Factor Identification 
Three primary criteria were established to allow evaluation and comparison of the 
costs of bids received. These were completeness, realism, and reasonableness. 
Completeness of bids was evaluated by assessing the level of detail the offerer provided 
in cost information required by the RFP (25:6). Realism was evaluated by assessing the 
compatibility of proposal costs with proposal scope and effort (25:6). The 
reasonableness of a bid consisted of evaluating a bid through cost or price analysis 
techniques (25:6). The Reasonableness Analysis establishes the starting point for our 
analysis of cost factors in this case. 
The following table identifies the factors used for evaluation of the C-5 
competition. The factors are grouped into four categories: Recurring Customer Costs, 
Comparability Adjustments, Department of Defense (DoD) Adjustments, and Strengths, 
Weaknesses, and Risk. Recurring Customer Costs indicate those items that can readily 
be compared across competing organizations over the life of the contract. Comparability 
Adjustments refer to those items that are necessary to make costs between different 
Services or public entities comparable (26:11). DoD Adjustment factors represent overall 
costs or savings to the DoD that must be considered over the life of the contract. The 
Strengths, Weaknesses, and Risk category highlights cost factors that are designed to 
capture a dollar equivalent of historically intangible benefits and risks that arise in 
conduct of assessing and quantifying the strengths, weaknesses, and risk associated with 
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an offeror. Examples include assessments from the Performance Risk Assessment Group 
(PRAG) or technical risk assessments from the Source Selection Evaluation Board 
(SSEB) Technical Team. This process will be referred to as "dollarization (24:42)" in the 
remainder of this document. Note that the Warner Robins bid served as the public offer 
rather than the incumbent SA-ALC (due to BRAC decision). 
Table 3 - Case II Cost Factors 
Warner Robins McDonnell Douglas Lockheed Martin 
Cost Element Cost Element Cost Element 
Recurring Customer Costs 
Direct Labor Direct Labor Direct Labor 
Direct Material Direct Material Direct Material 
Other Direct Other Direct Other Direct 
Production OH Production OH Production OH 
G&A G&A G&A 
C-5 Overhead Rate Adjust Profit Profit 
State Unemployment Payments 
Unfunded Civilian Retirement 
Depreciateion of MCP Facilities 
Casualty Insurance 
Military Non-Depot Costs 
Other Recurring Costs 










Department of Defense Adjustments 
Contract Administration 





Cost of Facilities Capital 
Govt. Transition (Personnel) 
Streright. Weaknesses, and Risk 
WIP Warranty 
Contract Administration 





Cost of Facilities Capital 
Govt. Transition (Personnel) 
Flowdays 
Recurring Customer Costs 
Direct Labor is simply the cost of directly chargeable labor applicable to 
performance of each bid (25:16,31,48; 26:16). Direct Material, expressed as a total 
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project cost, is the amount of material that is directly attributable to the performance of 
the bid by each party (25:16,31,48; 26:16). Each bidder also had costs categorized as 
Other Direct. These costs represent items such as the cost of travel or purchased services 
that cannot be attributed to other factors. (25:16,31,48; 26:16). Production Overhead 
refers to the amount of overhead cost that is attributed to production (25:16,31,48; 26:16). 
The costs included as General and Administrative are those remaining overhead costs that 
are not associated with production, but are still indirectly attributable to performance of 
the contract (25:16,31,48; 26:16). The final factor considered under Recurring Customer 
Costs is Profit. Private entrants provide their expected profit while public entities provide 
an adjustment to their overhead rates since they are at an advantage due to their non- 
profit status (25:16,31,48). 
Recurring Comparability Adjustments 
• State Unemployment Payments. This factor adjusts the public bid to include the cost 
of payments that private entrants would have to pay for unemployment benefits. This 
adjustment is necessary because unemployment payments are not part of the public 
entrants previous labor costs (25:33; 26:17,A-3). 
• Unfunded Civilian Retirement. This represents an addition to the public entrants 
expenses and negates the effects of DoD contributions the Civil Service Retirement 
System. The adjustment is made to the public entrant when competing against private 
entrants. No adjustment is necessary between two public entrants (25:33; 26:17,A- 
3,A-35). 
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• Depreciation of Military Construction Program (MCP) Facilities. Construction of 
depot facilities is accomplished with funds that are separate from the organizations 
operating budget. To capture the benefit received by the public bidder, the 
depreciated cost of facilities constructed with MCP funding is added to the public bid 
(25:33; 26:17). 
• Casualty Insurance. This adjustment compensates for the estimated cost of casualty 
insurance that a public organization would have to pay if operating without the 
benefit of government self-insurance practices. This factor covers the replacement of 
facilities and equipment due to casualty losses (25:33; 26:17, A-40). 
• Military Non-Depot Costs. Military non-depot costs are the quantified expenses of 
military personnel assigned to the depot who spend time on non-depot related duties. 
Examples are military training and parades. Only those military members that 
support the contracted workload are included in this adjustment (25:34; 26:17, A-35). 
• Other Recurring Costs. The public organization must include costs that will be 
incurred by the proposed alternative. In this case, the cost of test pilots were included 
in the public entrants estimates, however these personnel were to be government 
furnished to private entrants. For this reason a reduction in the public organizations 
estimate was in order. Other factors included in this category are Impact Aid (the 
amount of funds the Department of Education contributes to local public schools) 
Retiree Health Benefits, and Base Operating and Support Costs (25:34; 26:17-18). 
• Other Nonrecurring Costs. Like the previous category, this adjustment is made to 
identify costs that the public organization will incur during the course of performing 
the proposed work. The difference is that this category captures only the one-time 
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costs. An examination of Case II reveals that only the one-time labor cost of 
reservists supporting work-in-process for the transition period need be adjusted 
(25:34; 26:18). 
Department of Defense Adjustments 
• Contract Administration. This factor captures the costs that the public offeror will 
expend in performing routine administration of the contract. In this Case, it is the 
cost of additional employees who will monitor and oversee the performance of the 
contract (25:18,49; 26:23). 
• Federal Income Tax. Federal income taxes paid by private contractors reduce the true 
cost to the taxpayer (25:18,49; 26:24). An adjustment is therefore necessary to level 
the playing field. This adjustment is made only to the private offerers since the 
public entity does not pay taxes and therefore does not cause a reduction in the cost of 
a contract to the taxpayer. Calculations are subtracted from the private entities offer. 
• Overhead Costs. This factor captures the increased cost to overhead that will be 
incurred to workloads remaining at Kelly AFB. The increased cost results from the 
reduced base from which to "spread" overhead expenses of the remaining workload 
(25:49,50). 
• Overhead Savings. This credit is applied to offerers to offset the decreased cost of 
overhead rates that would be realized at Warner Robins AFB if the additional 
workload from Kelly AFB were added. The new work would create an increased 
base from which Warner Robins could spread existing overhead expenses (25:36). 
46 
• Reduction-In-Force Cost Estimate. The workload that will be contracted will no 
longer remain at Kelly AFB. As a result, there were 1298 positions that were 
identified for Reduction-ln-Force actions. Adjustments considered the cost of lump 
sum leave, unemployment compensation, medical insurance, PCS costs, training, 
Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay (VS1P), and Voluntary Early Retirement (VERA) 
(25:20,38,50). Had there been potential to place affected employees, this adjustment 
would not have been necessary. 
• Award Fees. Adjustments were made to the private offerors annual contact proposal 
price where the proposal included award fees or incentives. The adjusted amount was 
computed by adding 65% of the annual maximum fee/incentive to the annual contract 
proposal price (25:20,50). 
• BEQ Adjustment and Work-in-Process. This adjustment was necessary to adjust bid 
differences resulting from different interpretations in the RFP. For the sake of 
evaluation only, workload factors for BEQ and W1P were adjusted for all offerors 
over the same period of time (25:21,40,51). 
• Cost of Facilities Capital. Unique arrangements for the disposal of property 
associated with Kelly AFB made it necessary to adjust private bids downward to 
compensate for the subsidy, in the form of interest free mortgages and deferred 
payments, that they would receive. The majority of land, facilities, and equipment, 
associated with Kelly AFB, were transferred to the Local Redevelopment Agency in 
San Antonio. This loss of potential revenue and associated lease, below market 
value, served to subsidize private bids (25:21,51). 
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• Government Transition Personnel. This factor was necessary to quantify the cost to 
the Government of carrying Kelly AFB employees that were identified for RIF but 
not rehired by the offerers. The period of adjustment began with the date of contract 
award and continued through the RIF period. Calculations were made by month and 
took normal attrition into consideration (25:22,40,52). 
Strengths, Weaknesses, and Risk 
• Flow Days. In both the Warner Robins and Lockheed Martin proposals, adjustments 
were made to include the benefit of efforts to reduce the number of flow days below 
RFP requirements. Dollarization calculations were based on information obtained 
from the offerors technical proposals and from rates derived from Air Mobility 
Command (AMC) Flying Hour programs (25:42). 
• Paint Facility. The SSEB Technical Team determined risk in the Warner Robins 
proposal for flow of aircraft through the pain facility during the 2003/04 Fiscal Year 
(FY). The dollarized addition to their bid accounted for a probable 20% increase in 
direct labor costs during this time frame (25:42). 
• WIP Warranty. The final adjustment in the SA-ALC competition for risk was made 
to the McDonnel Douglas (MD) offer. MD offered the benefit of a limited warranty 
for Work In Progress accepted at transition. The dollarized value was calculated at 
1% of their WIP proposal. The basis for the rate was obtained from similar 
commercial warranties. 
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Case III - Workload Competition, SM-ALC 
Case Overview 
This case represents the second of two Public-Private competitions that will be 
examined. The focus of this case is the solicitation for the Depot Maintenance Workload 
at the Sacramento Air Logistics Center (SM-ALC) performed at McClellan AFB, 
California. The 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (DBCRC) 
directed the closure of McClellen AFB. Under DBCRC direction, a portion of the depot 
maintenance workload was transferred to the United States Army. Remaining work was 
to be reassigned after Public-Private competition. Workload involved programmed and 
unprogrammed KC-135 and A-10 aircraft inspection, maintenance, modification, and 
Analytical Condition Inspection, and overhaul and repair of Hydraulics, 
Instruments/Electronics, and Electrical Accessories and non-routed 
backshop/manufacturing support services (27:4). 
As with Case II, specific criteria were established to allow evaluation and 
comparison of the bids received. The overarching goal was to complete an integrated 
assessment of Best Value. The primary criteria evaluated centered on Transition, 
Operations, and Cost. Transition involved evaluation of an Integrated Master Plan, a 
Personnel Plan, and an Integrated Master Schedule. The Operations factors included KC- 
135 Aircraft, Hydraulics, Instruments/Electronics, Electrical Accessories, and A-10 
Aircraft. Cost factors, the focus of this research, are evaluated in much greater detail in 
the following paragraphs. 
49 
Cost Factor Identification 
The following table identifies the factors used for evaluation of the SM-ALC 
competition. Like the factors identified in Case II, the factors in this case are grouped 
into four categories: Recurring Customer Costs, Comparability Adjustments, Department 
of Defense (DoD) Adjustments, and Strengths, Weaknesses, and Risks. Recurring 
Customer Costs indicate those items that can readily be compared across competing 
organizations over the life of the contract. Comparability Adjustments refer to those 
items that are necessary to make costs between different Services or public entities 
comparable (26:11). DoD Adjustment factors represent overall costs or savings to the 
DoD that must be considered over the life of the contract. The Strengths, Weaknesses, 
and Risk category highlights cost factors that are designed to capture a dollar equivalent 
of historically intangible benefits and risks that arise in conduct of assessing and 
quantifying the strengths, weaknesses, and risk associated with an offerer. Examples 
include assessments from the Performance Risk Assessment Group (PRAG) or technical 
risk assessments from the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) Technical Team. 
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Table 4 - Case III Cost Factors 
SM Baseline OO-ALC Lockheed Martin 
Cost Element Cost Element 
Recurring Customer Costs 
Cost Element 
Direct Labor Direct Labor Direct Labor 
Direct Material Direct Material Direct Material 
Other Direct Other Direct Other Direct 





State Unemployment Payments State Unemployment Payments 
Unfunded Civilian Retirement Unfunded Civilian Retirement 
Depreciateion of MCP Facilities Depreciateion of MCP Facilities 
Casualty Insurance Casualty Insurance 
Military Non-Depot Costs Military Non-Depot Costs 
Other Recurring Costs Other Recurring Costs 
Department of Defense Adjustments 
Contract Administration Contract Administration 
Cost of Capital Cost of Capital 
Federal Income Tax Federal Income Tax 
Award Fees Award Fees 
GFM GFM GFM 
RIF Costs RIF Costs 
Govt. Transition (WIP) Govt. Transition (WIP) 
Govt. Transition (Personnel) Govt. Transition (Personnel) 
BOS Costs BOS Costs 
CRI/CSI CRI/CSI CRI/CSI 
Contract DMAG Surcharge Contract DMAG Surcharge 
GFE Depreciation 
St re rights. Weaknesses and Risk 
Transition Risk - Schedule/Efficiency Transition Risk - Labor 
Steady State Risk Transition Risk - Commodities 
Productivity Risk 
Recurring Customer Costs 
Direct Labor is simply the cost of directly chargeable labor applicable to 
performance of each bid (27:24, 61; 26:16). Direct Material expressed as a total project 
cost, is the amount of material that is directly attributable to the performance of the bid 
by each party (27:24, 61; 26:16). Each bidder also had costs categorized as Other Direct. 
These costs represent items such as the cost of travel or purchased services that cannot be 
attributed to other factors. (27:24, 61; 26:16). Production Overhead refers to the amount 
of overhead cost that is attributed to production (27:26, 62; 26:16). The costs included as 
General and Administrative are those remaining overhead costs that are not associated 
with production, but are still indirectly attributable to performance of the contract (27:27, 
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62; 26:16). The final factor considered under Recurring Customer Costs is Profit. The 
private entrant, Lockheed Martin, was required to provide an estimation of their expected 
profit (27:78). 
Recurring Comparability Adjustments 
• State Unemployment Payments. State unemployment payments are the amount of 
contribution the Department of Labor provides to a state's unemployment fund based 
on employment fluctuations. This adjustment is necessary because unemployment 
payments are not part of the public entrants previous labor costs (27:28; 26:17,A-3). 
• Unfunded Civilian Retirement. This represents an addition to the public entrants 
expenses and negates the effects of DoD contributions the Civil Service Retirement 
System. The adjustment equates to the amount of unfunded civilian retirement 
liability the public offeror will incur based on the number of employees covered by 
the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). The adjustment is made to the public 
entrant when competing against private entrants. No adjustment is necessary between 
two public entrants (27:28; 26:17,A-3,A-35). 
• Depreciation of Military Construction Program (MCP) Facilities. Construction of 
depot facilities is accomplished with funds that are separate from the organizations 
operating budget. To capture the benefit received by the public bidder, the 
depreciated cost of facilities constructed with MCP funding is added to the public bid 
(27:28; 26:17). 
• Casualty Insurance. This adjustment covers the risk for casualty losses and liability 
claims the Government assumes because it is self-insured and must pay for each loss 
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incurred. Private organizations are required to cover these risks, therefore the public 
offer must be leveled (27:29; 26:17, A-40). 
• Military Non-Depot Costs. Military non-depot costs are the quantified expenses of 
military personnel assigned to the depot who spend time on non-depot related duties. 
Examples are military training and parades. Only those military members that 
support the contracted workload are included in this adjustment (27:29; 26:17, A-35). 
• Other Recurring Costs. The public organization must include all costs that will be 
incurred by the proposed alternative. Factors included in this category are Impact Aid 
(the amount of funds the Department of Education contributes to local public schools) 
Retiree Health Benefits, Mobilization Support, and Base Operating and Support Costs 
(27:30-31; 26:17-18). 
Department of Defense Adjustments 
• Contract Administration. This factor captures the costs that the public offeror will 
expend in performing routine administration of the contract. In this Case, it is the 
cost associated with DCMC oversight of the contract and the establishment of new 
offices and expansion of existing offices to accommodate the competition workload 
(27:41; 26:23). 
• Cost of Capital. This adjustment is typically applied only to private offerers and 
represents the amount of income that would have been realized had capital 
investments been invested in a different fashion. In this case, adjustments were also 
made to a public offeror due to a teaming relationship with a private entity as part of 
their bid (27:41, 63). 
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• Federal Income Tax. Federal income taxes paid by private contractors reduce the true 
cost to the taxpayer (27:42, 63; 26:24). An adjustment is therefore necessary to level 
the playing field. This adjustment is made only to the private offerors since the 
public entity does not pay taxes and therefore does not cause a reduction in the cost of 
a contract to the taxpayer. Calculations are subtracted from the private entities offer. 
• Award Fees. Adjustments were made to the private offerors annual contact proposal 
price where the proposal included award fees or incentives. The adjusted amount was 
computed by adding 65% of the annual maximum fee/incentive to the annual contract 
proposal price (27:42, 64). 
• Government Furnished Material (GFM). This factor adjusts bids to compensate for 
the cost of GFE (or material) provided by the RFP (27:42, 64). 
• Reduction-In-Force (RIF)ZTransfer Costs. This adjustment accounts for the cost of 
transferring personnel to other government locations (i.e. OO-ALC) and the expense 
of RIF's for those individuals, at SM-ALC, who do not transfer to other government 
jobs (27:42, 64-65). Adjustments considered the cost of lump sum leave, 
unemployment compensation, medical insurance, PCS costs, training, Voluntary 
Separation Incentive Pay (VSIP), and Voluntary Early Retirement (VERA) (25:38). 
• Government Transition - Work-in-Process. This factor includes the cost of the 
workload that must be accomplished by SM-ALC during the transition to the winning 
bidder (27:43,65). Figures are based on projected WIP remaining until the contract 
period begins. 
• Government Transition - Personnel. An adjustment is necessary for the SM-ALC 
employees who are not placed into other jobs between the period of contract award 
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and normal attrition. Considerations are made for personnel hired by other bidders, 
used to complete the Government portion of the workload, retire, quit, or are loaned 
(27:43, 65). 
• Base Operating Support (BOS) Costs. Adjustments for BOS are necessary to account 
for expense to the government for ancillary services performed for general base-wide 
services. Costs such as fire protection and security fall into this category (27:44, 65). 
• Assets Storage. These costs are for material storage, warehousing, issuing, receiving, 
etc. over the contract period. Private offerers had to include the cost of services 
provided by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), while the public offerer did not 
due to existing availability of DLA support (27:44-45). 
• Contract Depot Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG) Surcharge. This cost 
represents a 1.5% surcharge expensed for Industrial Fund overhead charges. This 
adjustment is applied to the cost of all non-BRAC workload accomplished by a 
private contractor (27:45, 66). 
Strengths, Weaknesses, and Risk 
• Transition Risk - Ogden Air Logistics Center (OO-ALC). There were four areas of 
risk identified with the transition of workload to the OO-ALC (27:45-47). The first 
adjustment assumed that there would be a 45% drop in work force efficiency (worst 
case) impacting projected workload (by OO-ALC partner Boeing) to be accomplished 
by the remnant workforce at Sacramento. A second area of transition risk was 
identified in the optimistic 90% efficiency projected by Boeing for new work at the 
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old C-5 facility at Kelly AFB. This "new" workforce was estimated to begin at 75% 
efficiency and climb to 85% by the end of the first year. 
Additional risk was identified in the OO-ALC offer in its proposal to allow an 
operating location at SA-ALC to complete a portion of Commodities W1P. Where 80% 
efficiency was proposed, the cost team determined a 65% rate was more appropriate to 
account for a worst case scenario. Finally, the OO-ALC bid was adjusted to account for a 
worst-case efficiency of 65% during year one of operations at OO-ALC (27:47). 
• Transition Risk: Labor - Lockheed Martin (LM). Like the OO-ALC proposal, 
Lockheed Martin proposed leaving a portion of workload behind at Sacramento. 
Experience with the San Antonio Depot Competition (Case II) showed that 
efficiencies were overstated during the transition year and therefore an efficiency rate 
of 65% was more appropriate than the proposed 80% rate. The LM bid was also 
adjusted to account for the likelihood that its 90% projected efficiencies were 
unrealistic. The cost team used a rate of 80%, rising to 87%, for this adjustment 
(27:66). 
• Transition Risk: Commodities - LM. The cost team used similar methodology to 
account for Commodities transition risk. The commodities W1P to be accomplished 
at Sacramento was proposed to be 80%. The cost team adjusted this to 65% to 
account for the likelihood of additional risk. The 90% efficiency proposed by LM for 
direct labor was also adjusted to reflect a more realistic 85% initial rate, which would 
rise to 87% over the initial contract year (27:67). 
• Production Risk - OOALC. This factor was created to "quantify risk from the OO- 
ALC technical proposal and the risk associated with their ability to estimate future 
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costs (27:47)." The proposal identified a large reduction (over time) in commodity 
hours. The basis for this reduction was identified as process improvements and 
reengineered hours to complete work. The cost team accepted that a reduction of 
10% was achievable but reductions beyond that were to be considered as risk. The 
resulting adjustment quantified the number of hours that exceeded the 10% rate 
(27:47,48). 
•    Steady State Risk - OO-ALC. The risk identified in this factor represents the benefit 
received by a public offeror (here OO-ALC) as a result of full coverage, by the DOD, 
of net losses in Working Capital Funds (WCFs). This added funding capacity gives 
the public offeror a significant economic advantage over a private offeror. To adjust 
for this benefit, the OO-ALC bid was increased. The nature of this adjustment was 
such that a risk range was deemed more appropriate than a single estimate. This 
range was added to the other risk factors (Transition and Production to produce a 
Total Risk Range (27:49) with which to base decisions. 
Cross Case Comparison 
Overview 
The purpose of the following analysis is to summarize the results from the three 
cases and identify similar and disparate cost factors. In analyzing the three cases, it 
became immediately apparent that the structure used in the depot comparison, based on 
the Cost Comparability Handbook (26), was more concise, easier to understand, and 
more conducive to a thorough cost comparison. The baseline case, using COMPARE 
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and the A-76 Costing Manual (4) as its guiding reference, while containing more specific 
factors, tended to lend confusion. The primary source of confusion was that it is difficult 
to distinguish between factor categories, many with similar labels. Secondly, the more 
extensive use of "fixed" factors, where the user is asked to simply fill in the blanks, tends 
to limit comparison to only those factors, even though some provision is made to allow 
the inclusion of others. 
The format for the cross-case comparison will be to use the more extensive list of 
factors in Case 1 as the means of comparison. Factors from Cases II and III will then be 
matched, by definition, to those baseline factors. Unmatched factors will then be subject 
to further explanation. Table 5, below, is a compilation of the many factors identified in 
the analysis of individual cases. This serves as the starting point for the matching of 
factors, which follows. 
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Cost of Facilities Capital 
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State Unemployment Payments 
Unfunded Civilian Retirement 
Depreciateion of MCP Facilities 
Casualty Insurance 
Military Non-Depot Costs 
Other Recurring Costs 
DoD Adjustiments 
Contract Administration 
Federal Income Tax 
Award Fees 
Cost of Capital 
RIF Costs 
Govt. Transition (Personnel) 
Govt. Transition (WIP) 
Government Furnished Material 
BOS Costs 
CRI/CSI 
Contract DMAG Surcharge 
GFE Depreciation 
Strengths, Weaknesses, and Risk 
Transition Risk - Schedule/Efficiency 
Steady State Risk 
Production Risk 
Trasition Risk - Commodities 
Trasiton Risk - Labor 
Factor Comparison 
For clarity, the following convention will be used to differentiate between the 
individual cost factors and cost categories being compared. Individual cost factors will 
be italicized while the baseline/COMPARE cost categories, serving as the organizational 
basis for the following paragraphs, will be underlined. 
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• Personnel Costs. The first category COMPARE identifies is Personnel Costs. 
Included factors are Salaries, Wages, Other Entitlements, Fringe Benefits, Other Pay, 
and Overseas Allowances. This ties directly with the Direct Labor factor found under 
the Recurring Customer Costs category used in both depot competitions. 
• Material and Supply Costs. The second category used in the baseline model is 
Material and Supply Costs. This category represents a one-for-one match with the 
definitional intent of the Direct Material factor found in the Depot cases. 
• Other Specifically Attributable Costs is the next category identified by COMPARE. 
Depreciation under COMPARE has a direct match with Depreciation ofMCP 
Facilities in Cases II and III. Cost of Capital and Cost of Facilities Capital also form 
a direct match between the baseline and depots. The Recurring Customer Cost factor, 
Other Direct, in the Depot Cases is broken down into great detail in the COMPARE 
model. Encompassed in this single category are Rent, Maintenance and Repair, 
Utilities, Travel, Subcontracts, and Other Costs. Another factor in this category is 
Insurance, which has its depot complement, Casualty Insurance, under the 
Comparability Adjustments depot category. The SM-ALC depot competition adds a 
factor that can be included in this category. CRI/CSI Assets Storage is simply the 
warehouse and packaging expenses that must be included. 
• Overhead Costs. In the COMPARE model, this factor represents 12% of the Civilian 
Personnel Costs identified previously (4:68). This factor, or a calculated and 
approved substitute, compare with the Production OH category in the depots. Both 
are essentially indirect production expenses. The G&A factor and the BOS Costs 
factor from the depots are also identifiable with this category. 
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• Additional Costs. This factor is a sort of catchall for factors not yet captured. The 
focus of the COMPARE model focuses on those costs that result from "unusual" or 
"special" circumstances (4:70). Specifically listed are Current to MEO Transition 
Costs, Plant Rearrangements, Training, and Recruitment. Review of the criteria for 
factors in the depot cases, these adjustments can be matched to the Comparability 
Adjustment factors of Other Recurring Costs and Other Nonrecurring Costs. While 
the Cost Comparability Handbook (CCH) (26), does not specifically address these 
COMPARE factors, the flexibility to include them remains. 
• Contract Administration Costs. This category of factors, including Compliance 
Review, Payment Processing, Negotiating Change Orders, and Contract Closeout 
Expenses, has a direct match in the CCH and in the depot comparisons. Contract 
Administration, under Department of Defense Adjustments, is clearly a match. 
• Additional Costs. This Category/Factor found in COMPARE contains identical 
wording to the previous category of the same name. The only discernable difference 
is the designation that this category be used to adjust for costs incurred by a contract 
or 1SSA offeror but not incurred by the MEO (4:79). As stated previously, this 
category can be matched with the factors identified as Other Recurring Costs and 
Other Nonrecurring Costs in the depot cases. 
• One-Time Conversion Costs. Factors such as Retraining, Relocation, Joint Inventory, 
Security Clearances, and Separation Incentives are identified in COMPARE as One- 
Time Conversion Costs. The government uses a 4% severance factor to cover all 
costs associated with the involuntary separation of civilian employees. Equivalent 
Public-Private competition factors are RTF Costs and Government Transition for 
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Personnel costs. The major difference between models is the use of a standard rate, 
in the COMPARE model, versus a calculated amount in the Public-Private 
competition. A case can be made that the Public-Private factors of State 
Unemployment Payments and Unfunded Civilian Retirement are also included in the 
4% flat rate used in A-76. Other factors mated to this category are the cost of 
BEQ/WIP and Government Transition (WIP). Though not specifically addressed, 
they meet the intent of this COMPARE Adjustment. 
• Gain on Assets. COMPARE identifies this factor separately from the Cost of Capital 
category previously discussed. It differentiates itself by identifying as valid, only 
those costs of capital assets that will be used by the MEO but not made available to 
the contract/lSSA. The Public-Private competition and the CCH treat these costs as 
Costs of Facilities Capital when adjusting the MEO figures. 
• Federal Income Taxes. Both A-76 and Public-Private competitions make provisions 
for adjustment of bids for potential Federal Income Tax revenue. As stated 
previously, this adjustment accounts for the tax revenue generated by private 
contractors. This effect reduces the cost of a contract to the taxpayer and must be 
made equitable to private offerers. 
• Phase-in Period Costs. The CCH and depot competitions handle Phase-in Period 
Costs under Comparability Adjustments category. Specifically, these costs are 
included as Other Nonrecurring Costs. 
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Unmatched Factors 
The following factors are those that remain after logically matching all identified 
cost factors, found in the baseline case, with all cost factors utilized in the Public-Private 
depot competitions. When specific guidance, in the A-76 Costing Manual, was not 
available to directly link factors, a judgment call was made as to a factors proper 
inclusion. The basis for judgment was built on the perceived intent of the baseline 
category or factor. Intent was determined through review and interpretation of the 
available definitional guidance. 
• Minimum Conversion Differential. This category/factor has no equal in the Public- 
Private competition list of cost factors. The merit of this factor rests in its goal to 
instill a degree of risk reduction for some of the intangible factors associated with a 
competition. Eggers (Chapter II) highlighted this type of cost factor as a significant 
barrier to entry for private bidders. The private bidder must, above all things, turn a 
profit. To win an A-76 competition, a 10% differential must be overcome, even 
before a private offeror can be considered competitive. Only then can profit be 
considered. 
• Profit. This factor, seen in the depot competitions, has no unique equivalent in the 
COMPARE model. In the depots, profit was added to the cost of private offerers to 
clearly identify the total customer cost. COMPARE does not break this factor out 
explicitly; it is simply part of the aggregate of the winning private offerers bid. 
COMPARE simply selects the lowest cost after adjustments as the winning bid. 
• Military Non-Depot Costs. This depot factor adjusts for the quantified expenses of 
military personnel assigned to the depot who spend time on non-depot related duties. 
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The adjustment correctly considers military workload that will still have to be 
accomplished, at expense to the government, when military positions are eliminated. 
• Award Fee. This factor is included in depot competitions to account for the high 
likelihood of awards or incentives being paid to contactors. A flat 65% is added to 
the proposed maximum annual award fee/incentive specified in the contract in 
anticipation of the award/incentive being earned. 
• Overhead Costs and Savings. This adjustment is unique to the depot competitions 
and accounts for the increased costs, at the affected depot, as overhead rates for 
remaining workload have to be spread across fewer organizations. It also adjusts for 
the decreased cost of overhead at a public organization, which might obtain workload 
from another public entity, for opposite reasons. This factor should not be confused 
with the provisions for overhead previously defined. 
• Government Furnished Material. The COMPARE model views GFM as an 
equivalent value across all offerors and therefore an unnecessary cost to include in the 
comparison. The cost comparison accomplished for the SM-ALC saw the necessity 
of adjusting the cost to add back savings identified by OO-ALC. The cost team found 
that the savings were unsubstantiated. 
• Contract DMAG Surcharge. A factor found in the SM-ALC depot competition that is 
not seen in the other competitions is the Contract DMAG Surcharge. This factor is 
simply an adjustment to the OO-ALC bid to correct for a line-item deduction for the 
Air Force wide 1.5% surcharge for industrial fund overhead. OO-ALC incorrectly 
deducted the surcharge for the entire amount but should have included the portion of 
workload that was going to be accomplished by their private partner, Boeing. 
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Table 6 provides a visual representation of the results of the cross-case 
comparison. Cost factors from the Public-Private competition are matched to their 
equivalent factors in the COMPARE model. Where no exact match was found, the intent 
of the COMPARE category or factor was ascertained to identify similar factors. 
Significant in this table are the factors that remain unmatched (identified at the bottom of 
the table). These factors represent cost considerations that are unique to the Public- 
Private competition for depots. 
Unmatched Factors - Strengths, Weaknesses, and Risk 
These items (listed below and defined in their respective cases) are distinguished 
from the previous list of "Unmatched Factors" by their unique purpose. 
• Flow Days 
• Paint Facilities 
• WIP Warranty 
• Transition Risk (Labor, Commodities, and Schedule/Efficiency) 
• Steady State Risk 
• Production Risk 
Each represents the dollarization (explained at the beginning of Case II) of the 
strengths, weaknesses, and risk identified by members assigned to the Cost Team, PRAG, 
Technical Team, and Contracting Team of the individual competitions. It is in the nature 
of these factors, that the limitations of COMPARE become most apparent. There are no 
provisions to adjust bids based on these factors. 
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Table 6- Cross-Case Comparison: Final 









Material and Supply Costs 
Other Specifically Attributable Costs 
Depreciation 
Cost of Capital 
Rent 






Overhead Costs -C 
Direct Material 
Depreciateion of MCP Facilities 







Depreciateion of MCP Facilities 









Current to MEO Transition CostsT 
Plant Rearrangements J 
Training \ 
Recruitment -^ 
Other Nonrecurring Costs 
Other Recurring Costs Other Recurring Costs 
Contract Administration Costs 
Compliance Review 
Payment Processing 
Negotiating Change Orders 
Contract Closeout Expenses 
Additional Costs 
Contract Administration Contract Administration 
One-Time Conversion Costs 
Retraining Costs 
Relocation Costs 
Cost of Joint Inventory 
Security Clearances 
Separation Incentives 
State Unemployment Payments 
Unfunded Civilian Retirement 
RIF Costs 
Govt. Transition (Personnel) 
BEQ/WIP Adjustment 
' State Unemployment Payments 
Unfunded Civilian Retirement 
RIF Costs 
Govt. Transition (Personnel) 
■ Govt. Transition (WIP) 
Gain on Assets 
Federal Income Taxes 
Phase-In Period Costs 
Unmatched 
Minimum Conversion Differential 
Strengths, Weaknesses, and Risk 
Cost of Facilities Capital 
Federal Income Tax 
Other Nonrecurring Costs 
Profit 







Cost of Capital 
Federal Income Tax 
Profit 
Military Non-Depot Costs 
Award Fee 
Government Furnished Material 
Contract DMAG Surcharge 
Transition Risk - Schedule/Efficiency 
Steady State Risk 
Production Risk 
Trasition Risk - Commodities 
Trasiton Risk - Labor 
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V.      Summary 
Background 
An increased emphasis on achieving greater efficiencies in government operations 
has led to greater use of Outsourcing and Privatization (O&P) initiatives to select an 
offeror, public or private, to accomplish workload that has traditionally been achieved 
only by military personnel or government civilian employees. Under the guidance of 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Circular No. A-76, Performance Of 
Commercial Activities, organizations have been identified and selected for competition. 
To aid in conducting the competition, a software package, called COMPARE, was 
developed. The A-76 Costing Manual, produced by the DoD Competitive Sourcing & 
Privatization Office, complements COMPARE. COMPARE was designed to accomplish 
a very specific task: to compare a single public bid with that of a single private bid. 
Further more, COMPARE was designed to accomplish this task in a standardized format 
that could be applied across a wide variety of generic organizational structures. 
Over time, an increasingly wider and more diverse cross-section of organizations 
has become the target of consideration for O&P initiatives. The range of viable 
candidates has become narrowed to the point that further competitions are becoming 
increasingly difficult to model within the constraints of the current A-76 costing model 
(COMPARE). Specifically, the standardized cost factors used in COMPARE are 
increasingly insufficient in providing a level playing field on which decision makers can 
make informed comparisons. 
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Research Questions 
This thesis effort was undertaken to take a detailed look at the cost factors used in 
the COMPARE model and contrast them with cost factors utilized in the conduct of the 
more complex Public-Private competitions. These deviations (waivers) from the strict 
construct of COMPARE are approved in acknowledgement that one model does not fit 
all. This research answers the following questions: 
1. What are the baseline cost comparison factors established in COMPARE? 
2. What are the common cost factors found in Public-Private competitions? 
3. What are the similarities and differences between the cost factors established in 
COMPARE and those used in Public-Private competitions? 
4. What explains the differences between the cost factors established in COMPARE 
and those used in the Air Force Depot Public-Private competitions? 
5. What changes can be made to make COMPARE more robust in the comparison of 
more complex public and private entities? 
Methodology 
The research methodology most appropriate for providing responses to these 
questions is that of the Case Study (see Chapter III). In order to reign in the scope of 
study to a manageable level, three cases were selected as representative. The first case 
represents the COMPARE model itself. Since its use is highly standardized across the 
DoD, it represents all O&P cases utilizing COMPARE. Case 1 is the baseline study. To 
form a basis of comparison, the Public-Private competition efforts at two Air Force 
Depots were selected for Cases II and III. 
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Each case was analyzed individually to identify its cost factors, and then a cross- 
case analysis was conducted to compare and contrast the differences between them. This 
format is based on the construct of a Multiple-Case, Embedded Design, espoused by 
Robert Yin (6). 
Results 
Detailed analysis of the three cases provided significant insight into the 
differences between the COMPARE model and the Public-Private methodology. 
Expectations of the limitations of COMPARE were dispelled in favor of a better 
understanding of its capabilities and purpose. The following paragraphs highlight the 
conclusions manifested in Chapter IV. 
Low Cost vs. Best Value 
The dollarization of strengths, weaknesses, and risk decisively separates the A-76 
process and COMPARE from the cost comparison conducted in the depot Public-Private 
competitions. COMPARE sets out to identify the offeror with the lowest cost, responsive 
bid. Any concern for factoring in a bidders strengths, weaknesses, and risk is subservient 
to obtaining the lowest cost to the government. The COMPARE model assumes these 
risks will be attenuated by the type of service being sought (see Commercial/Core 
Activity discussion below), and adherence to the theory that prices will be driven down 
and quality will increase through competitive market forces. 
The depot Public-Private competitions also seek the lowest cost to the 
government however, the type and nature of service required mandates that best value be 
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considered as a significant driving force in selecting a winning offer. Best value is 
attained through thorough evaluation, quantification, and combination of strengths, 
weaknesses, risk, and price. 
Commercial Activities vs. Core Activities 
Chapter II provided significant detail in distinguishing Core Activities from 
Commercial Activities (CAs). At the inception of COMPARE, competitions were 
typically for low technology or service oriented activities. Alternative commercial 
sources were plentiful and the benefits of competition were easily achieved. 
As the DoD continued to search for ways to become more efficient, it began to 
look at activities that were clearly commercial activities, but were also increasingly 
complex or had limited commercial equivalents. Lines between what was considered a 
core activity and what was commercial began to blur into a continuum. Movement along 
the continuum towards core activities necessitated a need for models other than 
COMPARE to ensure the security of government interests. Deviations to A-76 
procedures were approved and Public-Private competitions were initiated to allow 
inclusion of best value as a criterion for selection of a winning offer. 
The following figure provides a graphic illustration of some important 
considerations in a competition model decision. It is important to remember that only 
Commercial Activities are considered for Outsourcing and Privatization. The definitions 
of what are and are not CAs do not change, just the interpretation. This change in 
interpretation results in movement along the continuum. One extreme highlights a pure 
Commercial Activity. The other typifies, a pure Core Activity. The model lists some 
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significant characteristics of each. Movement along the continuum necessitates an in- 
depth look at the desired end state of the competition. If the activity is service oriented 
and there are many potential offerors, then COMPARE may be suitable. As activities 
become more complex, and competition becomes more scarce, the Public-Private 
competition model should be given more consideration. There is no specific point at 
which a line can be drawn to delineate a model. All considerations must be taken into 





Low Cost Desired 





Best Value Desired 
High Skill Work 
High Complexity 





Figure 4 - Commercial Activities / Core Activities Continuum 
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Is COMPARE Enough? 
Upon inception of this study, many differences, between the cost factors seen in 
COMPARE and of those seen in the depot competitions, were expected. In reality, only a 
few were identified. In fact, the seven major unmatched cost factors (which excludes 
strength, weakness, and risk factors) could all be "custom" fit into the COMPARE model. 
They were left separate to highlight the probability that most of these costs were never 
envisioned for inclusion in the model. 
Suitability. COMPARE was found to be quite capable of integrating many of the 
cost factors used in the depot competitions. This does not mean that it is well suited to do 
so. COMPARE is designed to level the playing field between a single private bidder and 
a single public offeror. It accomplishes this, primarily, through adjustments to the public 
bid. To integrate the many factors found in the depot competitions, great care would 
have to be taken to ensure proper aggregation of applicable costs to the into the cost 
categories allowed in COMPARE. The issue of including additional private offers would 
also have to be addressed. 
Structure. COMPARE is very rigid in its design. This rigid structure tends to 
limit thinking beyond the cost factors identified in the A-76 Costing Manual (4). If a cost 
comparison is conducted, strictly by the guidance provided, the opportunity exists to 
leave other, possibly important, factors out of consideration. The software and the 
costing manual act more like checklists to be executed rather than starting points for 
exploration of necessary adjustments. In contrast, the open structure, provided in the 
Cost Comparability Handbook, as seen in the depot competitions, lends itself to expand 
thinking beyond factors identified. 
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Recommendations 
COMPARE should be modified to allow greater flexibility in the conduct of 
leveling the playing field. The basic framework exists to do so. The following 
suggestions represent possible solutions to questions raised during the course of this 
study. 
• Eliminate the down-select of private offerers in COMPARE (see Figure 3) to 
allow head-to-head comparison with more than one private bidder. This includes 
changing the format to include comprehensive adjustments for each offerer rather than 
the current approach which provides adjustment, primarily, of the only the public offer 
(Most Efficient Organization). 
• Expand capabilities to adjust bids based on any appropriate cost factor (by 
bidder). An extensive list of factors exists in the form of the Cost Comparability 
Handbook (26) and the A-76 Costing Manual. Leave flexibility to include previously 
unidentified factors. 
• Develop standardized tables, computational methodologies, and Cost Estimating 
Relations (CERs), that can be selected where applicable/appropriate, to model each cost 
factor. The ability for the cost comparison team to use alternative methodologies or 
calculations must be retained. 
• Include the provision for additional leveling based on strengths, weaknesses, and 
risk. Due to the highly volatile and complex nature of these factors, the best approach 
may be to simply allow for the importation and integration of risk assessments 
accomplished in other applications. 
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•     Change the tone of COMPARE, and its associated costing manual, from that of 
"here are the factors, here is how you will use them" to one of "there are many 
appropriate factors, here are many of them, include others as appropriate." 
Final Remarks 
The conclusions of this research show that COMPARE continues to be a viable 
model for the conduct of cost comparisons. The research also shows that there are some 
significant limitations that must be considered when determining the most appropriate 
model with which conduct Outsourcing and Privatization initiatives. Ideally, COMPARE 
should be expanded to encompass a broader range of competitions. For the short term, 
this does not provide the decision maker with a solution. 
The contribution of this research has been to formally identify the capabilities and 
limitations of the COMPARE model and to highlight areas for possible improvement. 
Logical avenues for further research would be to formally develop a standardized 
glossary of cost factors which encompass those identified in this research, the Cost 
Comparability Handbook, and the A-76 Costing Manual, as well as those revealed 
through formal evaluation (such as the Delphi technique) of subject matter experts. This 
new research, along with recommendations from this thesis effort, would form the basis 
for revision of DoD guidance in the conduct of outsourcing and privatization 
competitions. A new model, replacing or modifying COMPARE, could then be 
developed.   The benefit of revised guidance, coupled with a single model for conducting 
competitions, would be more thorough evaluation of important factors, improved 
accuracy, and elimination of the deviation approval process for routine requirements. 
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